Bernard Finel lays out an alternative strategy for Afghanistan:
- A “relatively rapid” withdrawal of combat forces from Afghanistan.
- Development aid and military assistance to the Afghan government.
- Should the Taliban regain power, “limited but consistent” diplomatic engagement and “credible communication” of “our commitment to again remove them from power if they in any way tolerate the establishment of anti-American terrorist networks on their soil.”
- Recommitment to do “everything in our power to resolve tensions between India and Pakistan.”
- Ensuring the safety and well-being of Afghans who have supported the U.S. since 2001.
- Continuing clarification of the international legal obligations of states regarding terrorist groups operating from their soil.
I have a number of problems with this.
The first one is fundamental. It isn’t a strategy. Whereas the U.S. and its partners in Afghanistan have tended to call any statement of desired outcomes a “strategy”, Finel’s list is all means and no end. What is the preferred end state here? If it is a viable, non-Taliban Afghan state, surely we agree that the strategy for getting there ought to be different from one for dealing with the Taliban? You don’t design a working strategy by caveating it with “in case we fail”. You choose an aim and plot a course. At least that’s what I was taught.
My second objection should be obvious to anyone who has read my previous posts on Afghan strategy. I simply don’t think this would work. And I think, with all due respect, that this line of reasoning is intellectually a little dishonest — it assumes the best when suggesting a withdrawal but the worst when discussing escalation.
In any case, it all sounds so, I dunno… 90s: political and material support to local power players, assistance and aid through the UN and NGOs, diplomatic “engagement” of good guys and bad, trying to keep the Indo-Pak rivalry at bay by long-distance mediation… I think it’s fair to say it didn’t work. And I think at this point in time, with all the historical evidence to the contrary, it’s wishful thinking to assume that without our military presence, a foreign-supported government in Kabul could withstand the Taliban assault — and that, when the Taliban did seize power, we could persuade them to play nice with the other kids just by threatening to slap them on the wrist with a wet tram ticket.
So, if it’s not a war, it’s not a strategy?
Here’s a strategy: how about the US’s troops head home, rebuild for ten years, and to hell with the world? Cause, we don’t want to end up like
Spain after the Armada sunk. Plus, are you kidding? The Taliban is a threat? To who, the kids next store?
India has carried on for thousands of years, I suspect they will continue to do so.
@Xiaoding,
The big brother next door has 100 sweaty nukes in the trustworthy hands of …ISI.
Even without, a global Talib with their AQ experts is a threat to London, Europe, and US targets. They’re not going to invade in mufti of course, but suits.
Well, there are nukes, then there are nukes. Pakistani nukes seem somewhat less threatening.
A global Taliban? Man, of man, that is pure fantasy! With Al Queda? Nuts!
There are these other countries, see, that also don’t want nukes and such roaming around, such as China, Russia, Suadi Arabia, Australia. It’s like thay are adults, and can make decisions and stuff. It’s like they would decide to kill anyone who even tried that kind of thing. Amazingly, they would kill people who tried it, even without 130,000 American troops to help them. Which is why America dosen’t need 130,000 troops over there, it seems that ZERO troops will accomplish the same thing!
The idea we can help resolve tensions between Pakistan and India just ain’t going to happen. It has been a pipedream for years as anyone who follows this issue knows.
That being said, the strategy seems fairly obvious here. It is what is known as a denial strategy, in other words denying the adversary victory. This is also known as a stalemate strategy where the enemy knows they cannot win and therefore becomes more willing to negotiate.