Oh please, not this again:
The preparations most important to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks took place not in training camps in Afghanistan but, rather, in apartments in Germany, hotel rooms in Spain and flight schools in the United States.
This meme of Afghanistan actually, really, truly not being so relevant to 9/11 has been doing the rounds ever since John Mueller mentioned the magic word “Hamburg” in Foreign Affairs five months ago (and got his head bashed in by commenters, yet chose not to respond).
It’s utter rubbish and I will deal with it in a later post, but for now, here’s Peter Bergen:
[...] The idea that Afghanistan is not an ideal place from which to launch anti-American attacks is simply absurd. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the first attack by Islamist terrorists against the United States, was led by Ramzi Yousef who trained in the Sadda training camp on the Afghan-Pakistan border. The bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998 that killed more than 200 were coordinated and carried out by men who had trained in Afghanistan, as was the attack on the USS Cole two years later.
And while [...] elements of the 9/11 plot were coordinated in Hamburg — where three of the pilots had lived in the run-up to the attacks — the idea of attacking iconic targets in Washington and New York was first hatched in Afghanistan in 1996; the coordination of the attacks took place in Afghanistan over the next several years; the pilots were given their specific orders about target selection and their duties by the leaders of al Qaeda when they travelled to Afghanistan in 1999, and all 15 of the ‘muscle’ hijackers passed through al Qaeda’s Afghan training camps.
Jari — I still don’t think that Bergen’s bit addresses the bigger problem with a “safe havens” approach, which is that the only thing you can reasonably expect to eliminate by establishing a competent Afghan government and security forces is a big terrorist bazaar with dudes in black pajamas running obstacle courses.
In the optimist’s “capable” Afghanistan of 2025, how are transnational, anti-globalist terrorists being prevented from having planning meetings in a Kandahar safehouse? How are they prevented from infiltrating across the Pakistani border into Kunar province to get orders from bin Laden’s successor, or his networked associates? How is some dude with a long beard and a big brain prevented from sitting in a cave and “hatching a terrorist plot”?
Well, in that case Afghanistan has become just like any other country — like, say, Germany –, not particularly hospitable to jihadists yet large and complicated enough to be impossible to police so thoroughly as to stop every “plot hatcher”. What it won’t be, however, is a state that actively supports and encourages transnational terrorism, which is what it will most likely become if/when the Taliban again seize power. (This is a larger issue, but suffice it to say here that it won’t be just Mullah Omar and his posse who’d be returning to power, they’d bring Gulbuddin and the Haqqanis with them, and, knowing some of those guys, I’m pretty sure that coalition won’t be what we like to call a “rational actor”.)
The other thing maybe to note here is that while safe havens may or not be useful for transnational terrorists, they’re absolutely essential for insurgents, at least in the Afghan context.
It is the sanctuary in Quetta for its leadership (and an open border) that allows the Taliban to run an effective justice/governance system for the south (Quetta being the “appeal court” that keeps the in-place magistracy/leadership honest and responsive to the locals; I don’t know how many times we saw tribal elders making the Quetta pilgrimage to make appeals to the main Quetta shura about specific insurgent excesses, etc.) Simply, their government “institutions” are not being blown up, while the Afghan government’s in Kandahar regularly are. They simply couldn’t provide as viable an alternative to the government if Quetta was denied to them.
The Quetta/Baluchistan sanctuary also props up the Taliban medical evac system, its logistics, and its fundraising, communications and recruiting efforts. So long as they remain unmolested there, there will be a strong insurgency in the Afghan south.
Jari — Well, in that case Afghanistan has become just like any other country — like, say, Germany –, not particularly hospitable to jihadists yet large and complicated enough to be impossible to police so thoroughly as to stop every “plot hatcher”
Be serious. Afghanistan will not “become just like any other country” that even remotely resembles Germany at any time in the 21st century. What’s far more likely is that it will become just like any other country like Yemen, or Mauritania, or perhaps even Somalia. (Or as others like to say, “the Chad/Burkina Faso of South Asia.”) I understand that you’re basically conceding that any country can play host to “plot hatchers,” and that Afghanistan is included in that list whatever the state of its government and security forces. But to even mention a developed nation alongside Afghanistan seems silly in this context.
What it won’t be, however, is a state that actively supports and encourages transnational terrorism, which is what it will most likely become if/when the Taliban again seize power.
I keep hearing this, but why are we so certain? There are several “if”s involved here: 1) IF the Taliban again seizes power, 2) IF the “Taliban” doesn’t splinter back into its constituent parts once the GIROA is overrun, 3) IF the Taliban hasn’t learned any lessons about the inadvisability and detrimental effects for their continued governance/existence of supporting transnational terrorism, 4) IF the Taliban believes that it’s impervious to continued offensive action on the part of Western nations simply because they no longer have 100K troops on the ground, 5) IF al-Qaeda determines that territory held by a friendly government is necessary or useful or conducive to operational success, and 6) IF the transnational terrorists decide to return to Afghanistan rather than remaining ensconced in their comfortably obscure hiding places in the mountains and cities of Pakistan.
That’s a lot of IFs, and I probably haven’t even listed half of them.
(This is a larger issue, but suffice it to say here that it won’t be just Mullah Omar and his posse who’d be returning to power, they’d bring Gulbuddin and the Haqqanis with them, and, knowing some of those guys, I’m pretty sure that coalition won’t be what we like to call a “rational actor”.)
As I alluded to above, why are we to believe that these disparate elements won’t simply splinter again, just as they have multiple times over the last thirty years? Why the sudden interest alignment?
And finally, I very much agree with what Bruce is saying about the usefulness of sanctuary for an insurgency (something I don’t think anyone would deny). Which, again, calls into question the rationale for the entire operation: how can you fight the war when you can’t touch the enemy’s center of gravity?
@ Gulliver:
Of course I don’t think Afghanistan will become like Germany; I just thought the analogy was useful since Hamburg gets mentioned all the time in this context. All I’m saying is, even in the best-case scenario — something like Rashid’s pre-1979 “minimal state” — Afghanistan will be just as open to forays by transnational plotters as any other country.
For what it’s worth, I think many of the ‘ifs’ you listed are more like semi-’whens’. For example, it boggles my mind how anyone could seriously doubt the Taliban and their co-jihadists wouldn’t overrun Kabul in a matter of months once the foreigners had packed up and left. What do you base that ‘if’ on, exactly? Similarly, where does the idea of the Taliban somehow “learning a lesson” come from?
Also, I think the American obsession with al-Qaeda is obscuring a significant part of the picture. I came across Kashmiris and Uighurs training in the camps in Afghanistan when Bin Laden was still in Sudan. Afghanistan as a failed state has been a magnet for non-state actors and a conduit for trouble for the whole region for nearly 30 years. I personally worry more about outfits like LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad than AQ, mainly because of their capacity to trigger confrontations between India and Pakistan, but also because sooner or later they will grow their own international ambitions.
Finally, I don’t quite understand what you mean by “disparate elements” or the Taliban “splintering back to its constituent parts”. If anything, the movement has proved remarkably robust. The same can be said of HiG and Haqqani’s group. To think that an implosion of some kind is imminent once they’ve captured Kabul is wishful thinking IMO.
Afghanistan will be just as open to forays by transnational plotters as any other country
Yes, precisely. So why don’t we universally recognize the impossibility of closing any country — but particularly in this case, Afghanistan — off to terrorist plot-hatchers?
For example, it boggles my mind how anyone could seriously doubt the Taliban and their co-jihadists wouldn’t overrun Kabul in a matter of months once the foreigners had packed up and left. What do you base that ‘if’ on, exactly?
Why do you presume that the only alternative to the present course or escalation is “pack[ing] up and [leaving]“? What is it that would prevent the U.S. (or NATO) from targeting insurgent military formations (which would, pretty obviously, be required to “overrun Kabul”) in order to prevent or forestall takeover? We were able to depose the Taliban government with an extremely limited footprint; why wouldn’t it be possible to preserve the GIROA through similar measures (meaning strike assets, combat advisors, and other enablers)?
Similarly, where does the idea of the Taliban somehow “learning a lesson” come from?
What do we presume “the Taliban”‘s objective is in this insurgency? A return to governing power, or the opportunity to return foreign/transnational terrorist networks to pride of place on Afghan territory?
Afghanistan as a failed state has been a magnet for non-state actors and a conduit for trouble for the whole region for nearly 30 years. I personally worry more about outfits like LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad than AQ, mainly because of their capacity to trigger confrontations between India and Pakistan, but also because sooner or later they will grow their own international ambitions.
While I understand your concerns about groups that could potentially destabilize the region, I think there are ways for bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to mitigate risk on that front. (There are obviously differences in scale, but Israel has somehow been persuaded not to take violent, destabilizing action against Iran in spite of Hizballah and Hamas provocations, as has the U.S. despite Iranian action contributing to the death of American servicemen in Iraq and Afghanistan. And yes, I appreciate that this train isn’t yet at the station, so to speak.) Your latter point about “international ambitions” strikes me as nothing more than worst-case scaremongering. We’re worried about Jaish and LeT, but not AQ, because they might become like AQ? What a curious idea.
Finally, I don’t quite understand what you mean by “disparate elements” or the Taliban “splintering back to its constituent parts”. If anything, the movement has proved remarkably robust. The same can be said of HiG and Haqqani’s group. To think that an implosion of some kind is imminent once they’ve captured Kabul is wishful thinking IMO.
I didn’t make myself clear on this: what I mean whe I put “the Taliban” in quotation marks is that I’m talking about those groups which constitute the broader insurgency, or what was once known as “Anti-Afghan Forces” — why should we expect them to hold, to have any sort of cohesive strategic plan or governing vision?
So why don’t we universally recognize the impossibility of closing any country — but particularly in this case, Afghanistan — off to terrorist plot-hatchers?
Well, I for one do.
What is it that would prevent the U.S. (or NATO) from targeting insurgent military formations (which would, pretty obviously, be required to “overrun Kabul”) in order to prevent or forestall takeover? We were able to depose the Taliban government with an extremely limited footprint; why wouldn’t it be possible to preserve the GIROA through similar measures (meaning strike assets, combat advisors, and other enablers)?
Okay, poor choice of words on my part. The Taleban won’t “overrun” Kabul; the Karzai regime more likely will self-destruct due to defections and a general lack of legitimacy just like Najib’s did in 1992. I don’t see how air strikes or SOF ops or advisors etc. can prevent this.
What do we presume “the Taliban”’s objective is in this insurgency? A return to governing power, or the opportunity to return foreign/transnational terrorist networks to pride of place on Afghan territory?
Excellent question. To re-establish the Emirate for sure. Does that mean their sense of self-preservation has improved over the years, or that they would be more willing to accommodate the wishes of foreign powers (whom, incidentally, they would’ve just chased away)? I have my doubts.
Your latter point about “international ambitions” strikes me as nothing more than worst-case scaremongering. We’re worried about Jaish and LeT, but not AQ, because they might become like AQ? What a curious idea.
Why is it curious to think that even if AQ’s fortunes fade, others will take its place? There’s already evidence that LeT has its eyes on overseas targets. And why is it “scaremongering” to suggest this type of terrorism won’t go away but, what, “realism” to say Afghanistan will never be free of plot hatching jihadis?
What I mean whe I put “the Taliban” in quotation marks is that I’m talking about those groups which constitute the broader insurgency, or what was once known as “Anti-Afghan Forces” — why should we expect them to hold, to have any sort of cohesive strategic plan or governing vision?
What groups are you referring to? The insurgency may be multifaceted in that people taking part in it have different motives, but why do you say the elements are disparate? I’m genuinely curious — can you point me to a source?
If the US has even the slightest presence in Afghanistan, or the ability to make its presence there occur on a whim (think offshoring counterterrorism). Then there will be no AQ or any other terrorist safe havens or training camps in the country.
You can get minute and particular… but suppressing that type of threat doesn’t take much. Certaintly not 70,000 troops when were succeeding in the same way with 20,000.
What groups are you referring to? The insurgency may be multifaceted in that people taking part in it have different motives, but why do you say the elements are disparate? I’m genuinely curious — can you point me to a source?
Maybe “disparate” isn’t the right word, but let’s not forget that the Taliban and HiG were rival factions once upon a time. I don’t think it’s reasonable to assume that they have a unified political vision just because they’re mutually opposed to the present government and/or the occupation.
“This meme of Afghanistan actually, really, truly not being so relevant to 9/11… It’s utter rubbish”
I think the larger issue is that there is no reason to believe that solving Afghanistan will prevent another 9/11. The relevance of Afghanistan to 9/11 does not mean that it will be relevant to the next major attack.
One of the reasons that Afghanistan was a launch pad for transnational terror is because we largely forgot about it and underestimated the risks. If we were to leave again, I doubt that we would take a similar approach to before 9/11 and just let it fester. I suspect that our policy toward Afghanistan would resemble our policy towards Somalia (this is not to suggest that I’m advocating for the George Will course of action).
@ Gringolost:
If the US has even the slightest presence in Afghanistan, or the ability to make its presence there occur on a whim (think offshoring counterterrorism). Then there will be no AQ or any other terrorist safe havens or training camps in the country.
Hoo-boy. Talk about famous last words…
BTW, where has the U.S. succeeded in containing a terrorist threat / suppressing an insurgency with 20,000 troops? Surely you don’t mean Afghanistan ca. 2002??
@ Gulliver:
I don’t think it’s reasonable to assume that they have a unified political vision just because they’re mutually opposed to the present government and/or the occupation.
So let me get this right: It’s reasonable to assume that the Taliban have learned from their past mistakes and wouldn’t host AQ ever again, but it’s not reasonable to assume they have learned that dumping Gulbuddin won’t work if you want to run the country without engaging in non-stop civil war?
@ Schmedlap:
Agreed. As for the second part, I really hope you’re right. But being a grizzled old hack and having followed the downward spiral in Afghanistan and Pakistan for 30 years, I can’t help but feel a liiitle pessimistic about the willingness of the West to pay attention to Afghanistan once their assets are out of the country.
Maybe I should choose my words more wisely. My main point was that we can accomplish what we need to in Afghanistan with far less our resources.
And Jari’s “famous last words” may be let’s focus on Taliban-HiG in Afghanistan while the future threats we face are not going to come from there.
Here’s a point to ponder: we never suppressed and insurgency. I was implying (unsuccessfully) that we do not need to suppress an insurgency just counter-terrorists. If you think we need to counter numerous different insurgencies in Afghanistan, then you are implying that the US needs to have a presence in each region, each city/town/village of Afghanistan. There’s 100,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan right now. That equates to about 5 NATO troops per Afghan village. Is that nearly enough to win their “hearts and minds”. Seriously? We’ll win their hearts and minds with 5 troops per village, who come with one hand bearing dollars and the other holding an M-4. Really?
So yes, Afghanistan 2002 is what I mean. We pushed AQ out, destroyed their bases of support, and eliminated the camps that were there. We need to move on and think about the world differently now. A map of the globe should show that threats to our safety come from other places besides Afghanistan, and our Afghanistan-centric approach is diverting our attention in what seems to have become a hobby-horse for the few who are directing policy.
@ Gringolost:
Look. I’m not implying anything. Increasingly, I’m finding Afghanistan a lost cause.
So yes, Afghanistan 2002 is what I mean. We pushed AQ out, destroyed their bases of support, and eliminated the camps that were there. We need to move on and think about the world differently now. A map of the globe should show that threats to our safety come from other places besides Afghanistan, and our Afghanistan-centric approach is diverting our attention in what seems to have become a hobby-horse for the few who are directing policy.
No — you didn’t “push AQ out”, you let them slip out, and then you went off to chase shadows in Iraq. That’s what you did. By all means, move on, but at least be honest about what you achieved in Afghanistan, because it is absolutely nothing, and this disaster will come back and bite you in the ass one day while you’re engaged in dealing with your “new threats”. (And yeah, you can call me a scaremonger if it makes you feel better about it.)
@ Scaremonger
We did both, push them out and let them slip out.
But, I’m confused to what’s your point: should we stay in Afghanistan, as we are? Should we do more? Should we do less? Are you saying we’re damned if we do, damned if we dont?
I’m saying we need to realize our limits, re-focus our efforts, and not double-down on Afghanistan.
@ Wishfulthinker:
But, I’m confused to what’s your point…
And rightly so. I haven’t exactly been clear on this. For what it’s worth, here’s what I think:
I consider it inevitable that the war in Afghanistan will be lost. The undertaking required to change the dynamics of the place to such a degree as to prevent it from again becoming a terrorist sanctuary — in short, to build a minimal, viable Afghan state — is simply too massive, both militarily and in terms of aid and assistance, to ever happen. The United States and its European allies will abandon Afghanistan. Maybe not this year, maybe not the next, but it will happen. Do I think more should be done? Yes, definitely. Do I think more will be done? Most certainly not.
On more thing. Those “future threats” you mentioned, they’re mostly old threats. They emanate from places like Somalia and the Middle East, all of which the U.S. at one time or another has toyed with and then left to go dilly-dally someplace else. Unfinished business all. So let’s just add Afghanistan to the list and hope for the best.
That’s the first time that anyone has ever called me a wishful thinker. I would say I’m more of a pessimist.
I think you are wrong to say that places like Somalia are old threats. Just yesterday, there were retaliatory attacks against African Union soldiers. Piracy still emanates from Somalia. The Middle East is still how a lot the world’s energy needs are met, so the security of the region is still vital, not “old” news.
There’s not much of an alternative to just “toying” with these areas as you say. The opposite of which would be full-blown occupation, or long-term colonization. Both of which do not receive much support in the US (as can be seen by public opinion).