Still smarting from my brutal yet inconclusive mano-a-mano over Afghanistan with a tenacious but ill-informed German isolationist, I was lazily browsing through this week’s crop of dismal Afghan analysis when I came across this.
Aptly titled “Graveyard of analogies”, it’s a new article by the eminently wise Pakistani journalist-scholar Ahmed Rashid, and it basically says the same thing I was so crudely trying to articulate when I suggested we should “take a break from that tired old Soviet analogy”. Money quote:
Since the first American bombs fell on Afghanistan in October 2001, a cottage industry of doomsayers has arisen among academics and journalists, warning that the US will fail in the so-called ‘graveyard of empires’ just as the Soviets did.
As Barack Obama takes office – and reiterates his intention to send 30,000 more troops into Afghanistan, such prophecies have returned anew, insisting that Afghanistan is a cesspool of ungovernable tribes, unscaleable terrain and unwinnable wars.
But to compare the American and Soviet invasions is misguided [...]: the Soviets had no support inside or outside the country when they blundered in with their tanks to prop up an unpopular Afghan communist government that took power by coup.
More precisely:
The American failures in Afghanistan were not foreordained by Afghanistan’s unyielding terrain or fractious tribal politics: they were failures of decision-making and commitment in an attempt to achieve ambitious goals with minimal resources. George W Bush, who disdained ‘nation-building’ as he ran for president in 2000, had no plans to do it in Afghanistan.
And while you’re at it — particularly if you still believe Afghanistan is “a land-bound, utterly isolated low economy country without cultural or political relevance to us”, as my esteemed blogger colleague from Germany does — read what Barnett Rubin has to say about that:
The history of Afghanistan over the last thirty-five years has been that of the end of the country’s status as an isolated buffer state. Rather than separating conflicts, Afghanistan now links them. Ten years ago Afghanistan, besides having a low-intensity conflict between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, was also the scene of India-Pakistan and Sunni-Shia conflicts and, to a certain extent, U.S.-Iranian-Russian competition over pipeline routes. All of those conflicts have only become more intense. In addition, today Afghanistan is the theater for the War on Terror, the ill-defined confrontation between the United States and global Islamist movements; the conflict between NATO and Russia; the confrontation between the United States and Iran; the struggle within Pakistan over that country’s future; and a transnational insurgency spanning Afghanistan and Pakistan and linked to al Qaeda. Finally, there is a higher level of mobilization around the ethnic, tribal, regional, and sectarian cleavages that have always marked Afghan politics.
I’m sure a nimble mind can come up with any number of excuses to dismiss out of hand even these grand old men of Afghan studies, but one thing is incontestable: myth-mongers or war-lovers they’re not.
I wrote something similar in a review of David Loyn’s book last month.
However, I wouldn’t say that failed analogies are a necessarily an argument for escalation.
“Isolationist”? Why? Because I despise a war far away and prefer cooperation over confrontation in foreign policy?
That’s closer to “anti-imperialist” than to “isolationist”.
“the Soviets had no support inside or outside the country when they blundered in with their tanks to prop up an unpopular Afghan communist government that took power by coup.”
That sounds a lot like an analogy. The Socialist government kept its seat in Kabul till a general deserted and became warlord. They survived for several years after the Russian withdrawal – that’s no performance that we’d expect of the Karzai government right now afaik.
Sven:
I also called you “tenacious but ill-informed”, and your comment illustrates my point:
1. Najibullah survived for three years after the Soviet pullout — I guess it’s in the eye of the beholder whether that’s “several years”.
2. As you must know, one of the main reasons for even this kind of “staying power” was the fact that the Soviets left Najib well supplied with hardware. I can personally attest to this, having been on the receiving end of Najib’s tank shells and cluster bombs near Gardez back in 1991.
In short, with that sort of firepower at his disposal, and with no scruples to use it indiscriminately, it was no wonder he managed to cling to power as long as he did. Contrary to what you seem to suggest, Communism had nothing to do with it.
BTW, I don’t see why any of this matters in the present context.
“no support”, “unpopular” – even a government with all the arms of the world would not have lasted for years if it had not considerable support inside the country.
History doesn’t fit well into the description that you cited, that’s why it matters.
There are analogies and there are differences in the conflict – as always. The analogies are useful because common reasons lead to common developments.
The greatest Russian problem (besides a lack of good infantry) was the logistical problem; their dependence on truck traffic along a single main supply route and the use of huge but still vulnerable convoys. They ceded the control of the countryside and had to fight for the roads to at least survive in the country.
That might be what will happen to NATO as well, especially once the U.S. troop strength will be increased.
The tooth to tail ratio is already suboptimal, a fixation of many combat troops on road security will further decrease the ratio of effective countryside control forces to overall forces.
It’s also noteworthy that the Pashtu have never in history been long-time friends with foreign forces in the country or otherwise. The inhabitants of Afghanistan tend to be intolerant of foreign forces since about 2,400 years at least.
It was always easy to invade (unless you try to do so at winter), but it was always equally difficult/impossible to control the area with foreign forces.
Insurgency theory says that insurgents can sustain/succeed where the government forces cannot find them easily – either among population or in areas with poor traffic infrastructure. Afghanistan has very poor traffic network and a large population – it’s almost ideally suited for insurgents.
The success of past uprisings has reasons, that’s why analogies are helpful; they help to see persistent reasons for failure for attempts like ISAF/OEF-A.
Sven, rural Pashtuns are just as likely to view Pashtun rulers in Kabul/Kandahar as “foreign” as anyone from NATO. You completely decontextualize Pashtun patterns of conflict when you (and other ill-informed commentators) make statements like the one above.
But anyway, US/NATO shouldn’t put more troops in for the immediate reason that it’ll make things not better, but the same or worse.
Sven:
“Even a government with all the arms of the world would not have lasted for years if it had not considerable support inside the country.”
Like I said, it didn’t exactly last “for years”…
Anyway, I’m starting to detect an ideological tendency here. You’re a communist, is that it? Otherwise I can’t for the life of me understand where total ignorance like yours stems from. That Najibullah would have had “considerable support inside the country” is not only total rubbish, it’s so appallingly arrogant I don’t know what to say. The guy was a torturer and a puppet. If you can’t come to terms with historical facts like these, you have little hope of understanding the present conflict.
Nope, I’m a green-liberal.
“Communist” is the typical guess of those who cannot or don’t want to cope with complex opinions.
It’s like I wrote – a state without support crumbles much quicker than the Afghan socialists after the Soviet departure. Weapons are dead matter that doesn’t support a government – men who use weapons do so. They don’t without loyalty, though.
The collapse would have happened immediately or within months (like the U.S. expected; less than half a year), not after 38 months if the government had “no support”.
They even ultimately collapsed for economic reasons, not for lack of support among the own ranks.
That doesn’t fit to your description at all, you’re opposing history.
By the way; would we expect Karzai to last for 38 months after a Western withdrawal (or longer with sustained subsidizing)? By the way – is Karzai no puppet and torturer? I’m quite sure about the puppet thing.
@Ian;
that’s logically unrelated.
Sven:
“Nope, I’m a green-liberal.
‘Communist’ is the typical guess of those who cannot or don’t want to cope with complex opinions.”
The reason I asked was that people with strong ideological beliefs often disregard everything, including historical facts, that doesn’t support their views — just like you do, in this case when insisting, against overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that Najib enjoyed popular support.
I myself have voted left at times, so I don’t really mind if one is a communist. I’m just at a loss as to why you keep making arguments that have no factual basis. Or perhaps you can point me to a study that supports your claims about Najib?
Why should I when you disregard historical evidence?
Organizations don’t work if no-one is loyal, but their organization kept working/fighting for three years.
It is obvious that they had considerable support, no matter what you experienced or imagine.
Maybe you can explain how a government in a civil war could last 38 months with “no support” in the population?
For comparison: That’s almost as long as the American Civil War, the Russian Civil War or the First World War lasted.
“Why should I when you disregard historical evidence?”
The fact is, Sven, that you have no factual basis whatsoever for your claims, which seem to be based on mere gut feelings, and it’s frustrating as hell talking to a wall like this. I don’t mind having a debate, but when one almost completely lacks command of the facts, and therefore cannot bring up a single source to back up an argument, discussion becomes an exercise in futility. And it’s not the first time, either. I remember you once arguing that ISAF is not fighting a war in Afghanistan. Faced with nonsense like this, all I can do is give up and wish you a happy life with your fantasies.
About the ‘money quote’:
“But to compare the American and Soviet invasions is misguided [...]: The Soviets had no support inside or outside the country when they blundered in with their tanks to prop up an unpopular Afghan communist government that took power by coup.”
1) The Soviets needed no “outside support” for their invasion because they shared a long land border with Afghanistan (the Manas Air Base in Russia’s Kyrgyzstan republic still supports the U.S. American invasion today, did you know that?).
2) In relation to the “popular support” which the U.S. American “liberators” enjoy in Afghanistan today, unlike their Soviet predecessors:
“Kerry questioned why the Taliban, with fewer resources, are able to field fighters who are more committed than Afghan soldiers. ‘What’s going on here?’ Kerry asked.”
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/07/27/politics/main6718218.shtml