David Betz at Kings of War has read the news that the German ISAF troops in Northern Afghanistan are miserable, beer-guzzling fatbodies:
They’re not too chubby and cheery to fight the Taliban; they’re not fighting as a matter of policy of the German government. This raises the question what they’re there for in the first place. Surely this is a question the troops ask themselves. In the absence of any answer from the German government small wonder they fill their time drinking.
Actually, this shouldn’t come as a surprise, as their mission is more than clear: it’s not warfighting; it’s peacekeeping.
There are two ISAFs in Afghanistan. One is in combat; the other is, well, hanging out. In the South, it’s fear and death; in the North, beer and boredom. They may sport the NATO insignia, but for all practical purposes, the Germans, Swedes and Finns in their well-supplied camp-cities are running a classic UN blue beret operation with all the trimmings, including after-sauna refreshments.
This is not a fighting force, because it was never meant to be one, and consequently it lacks the training, the equipment, and most of all, the attitude to shoot and kill. Yet, they’re not hopeless. Put these guys in harm’s way, and they perform like pros. The Finns in Maimana, for example, were a tight-knit, highly motivated and disciplined bunch. With a group of Norwegians, they fought off a local mob against desperate odds in 2006; eventually, before they redeployed to MeS in 2007, they lost one of their own, a quiet and unassuming sergeant I once met, in an IED blast.
Most of these guys were reservists — cooks and ambulance drivers –, yet after the riot they became extremely redeployable, and as far as I know, some of them ended up serving in Chad and elsewhere. But the Lieutenant Colonel who commanded the defenders of the PRT base, a nice guy and a great soldier, has all but disappeared. Last I heard, he was on his way to a desk job in a supply depot somewhere in Central Finland. Clearly, the country couldn’t figure out what to do with its hero.
As Finland wraps up peacekeeping missions in places like Kosovo, it could easily quadruple its commitment to ISAF. Even those 400 troops would be a token force in the South; still, if there’s anything we’ve learnt from this war, it’s that symbolism matters. But the political will, of course, doesn’t exist. For reasons the Finnish government has never explained, it appears we would rather have soldiers growing a gut inside a garrison than doing what they’re trained to do.
There aren’t two ISAFs, but ISAF and OEF-A.
ISAF is in fact officially and in practice peacekeeping.
OEF-A is about fighting the Taliban/AQ.
The German commando contingent wasn’t called to action by OEF-A leadership in years for hot missions and the political mandate was therefore withdrawn.
The German ISAF peacekeeping mandate grew over time, as did the German responsibilities in the Northern sector. The increased dependency on truck convoys coming from the North will add to the responsibilities.
About the garrison thing; the German KFOR contingent in Pristina was said to have mobilized almost everyone to fight off the riots n Kosovo one or two years ago. That would happen in Kabul during a crisis as well. So far, more aggressiveness would likely not be very helpful.
Btw, many of the German troops in Afghanistan are in infantry battalions afaik.
You’re in error. The British, Canadians, Dutch, and others fighting in the South are certainly part of ISAF, not OEF. ISAF is neither officially nor in practice primarily a peacekeeping force, as its own campaign plan, a summary of which was recently declassified for Small Wars Journal, clearly states:
“ISAF conducts operations in partnership with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and in coordination with Operation Enduring Freedom, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the international community in order to assist GIRoA to defeat the insurgency, establish a secure environment, extend viable governance, and promote development throughout Afghanistan.”
The campaign plan goes on to list “key planning factors”:
“- Counterinsurgency campaign.
- Shape, in order to clear in order to hold and build.
- Prioritize the areas to clear and hold.
- Establish and maintain freedom of movement.
- Apply greater effort on the narcotics-insurgency nexus.
- Identify and engage key Afghan community leaders.
- Interdict and disrupt insurgent movement to and from sanctuaries in the border region.
- Build Afghan capability, capacity, and credibility.”
I challenge you to tell me how any of this fits the classic definition of peacekeeping.
It’s pretty much peacekeeping once you shed the idea that peacekeeping doesn’t include combat.
Sure, ISAF shall disarm fighters and take control of regions – just like humanitarian, counter-narcotics and other strongly peacekeeping tasks.
The only official characteristic of ISAF that is not peacekeeping-like is its partiality – it sides with the Afghan central government. Well, and it’s no U.N.-controlled mission.
A look at both ISAF and OEF shows that OEF(-A) is the anti-terror-oriented combat operation while ISAF is the mission to assist the Afghan government.
I admit that I exaggerated the difference in my first comment. ISAF has drifted a lot towards a combat-oriented activity and many people dismiss the difference between OEF and ISAF entirely (including the Afghans apparently, who only seem to see foreigners or nationalities at most, not different mandates).